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Abstract 
  The purpose of this research is to develop a rainfall insurance product to insure 
irrigation costs applied to NAP crops, and to compare  the efficacy of this insurance on a 
dollar basis relative to conventional crop insurance. An economic model is developed that 
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I. Introduction 
Despite the best efforts of the U.S. Risk Management Agency, there remain many 
specialty crops in the U.S. under Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Programs (NAP) 
with insurance policies that do not represent the true nature of risks.  Given their economic 
significance, it is surprising that so little attention has been provided to specialty crops in 
terms of risk management.  
  Weather insurance, a new approach to risk management, is based on transparent, 
easily observed weather at a specific site and provides firms with the ability to manage 
volumetric risk that derives from seasonal deviations from longer-term climatic norms. 
Although several studies have explored the issue of rainfall insurance in agriculture,   
Bardsley, Abey, and Davenport (1984), Gautman, Hazell, and Alderman (1994), Patrick 
(1988), Quiggen (1986), Sakurai and Reardon (1997), Turvey (2000, 2001), there are no 
known studies dealing with weather insurance to protect specialty crops against costs of 
irrigation in drought years. 
  Water is used to manage growth in many vegetable, fruit, and cereal crops. Drought 
years create significant difficulty for these crops as production costs soar from the use of 
irrigation pumps, fuel and labor.  In many instances, state governments have had to sign 
Emergency Disaster Relief bills to cover unprotected crops.  From an economic point of 
view, a loss due to a shortfall in yields is not different on a dollar for dollar basis than a 
loss due to increased costs of irrigation.  Since the purpose of irrigation is to achieve the 
maximum yield potential of a normal rainfall year, the main consequence of rainfall or 
drought risk is in the cost of irrigation. However, in the same way that a wheat producer on 
non-irrigated land would suffer greater loss due to yield shortfalls in a year of drought, the   4
wheat farmer on irrigated land mitigates the yield loss but incurs an additional cost of 
irrigation.  
The purpose of this research is to develop a rainfall insurance product to insure 
the costs of irrigation applied to NAP crops. To this end, the next sections provide the 
theoretical framework of modeling the irrigation cost insurance. This is followed by a 
description of the cross sectional data and estimation procedure. The fourth section 
presents the empirical results and the last section discusses the usefulness of this new 
product and provides a conclusion to the research. 
 
2.  Conceptual Framework  
In this section, we develop an economic model of irrigation cost insurance to 
illustrate the relationship between a weather variable (rainfall = ω), crop yields y(ω), costs 
of irrigation c(ω) and profits π(ω). We consider multiple states of nature but essentially we 
simplify the process by defining a maximum potential yield that occurs when weather is 
favorable or good. That is  
(1) 
 =  Y
max () y ω
good
 
Since the maximum potential yield acts as an absorbing barrier for all of  the weather 
stated as good the marginal value product of irrigation above the threshold ωgood is zero. 
When rainfall falls below  ωgood the marginal productivity of rainfall increases but at an 
increasing rate. The production function for output is thus 
(2)  
 =  Y () MIN , y
max () f ω
 
where ymax= f(ωgood ) > f(ω ). Therefore for ω < ωgood  
(3)  
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which simply states that as water to the plants increases, plant growth increases but at an 
increasing rate. 
We now consider the cost of irrigation C. The cost function is given by 
(5)    =  C () MAX , 0() c ω . 
If  ω>ωgood there is no need to irrigate so the cost is zero. Otherwise the cost increases as ω 
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The profit function can now be described in terms of the rainfall variable, output, and 
irrigation costs as  
(8) 
 =  π  −  P () MIN , y
max () f ω () MAX , 0() c ω
 
Where P is the per unit price of the commodity. From (8) it can be seen that profits are 
given as Pymax if rainfall is adequate and Pf(ω)-c(ω) if rainfall is inadequate. Furthermore, 
assuming that rainfall is inadequate, marginal profits obey 
(9) 
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Marginal profits are positive since the first term is increasing in ω, while the second term is 
decreasing in ω. In terms of risk and risk mitigation the result states that as rainfall 
decreases output will fall. In order to increase output, rainfall, in the form of costly 
irrigation, must be applied. Therefore in years of drought the dual effects of decreased 
yields and increased irrigation costs result in significant economic losses. Even if irrigation 
increases yields to its maximum level, the cost of irrigation remains as an uncertain cost to 
the producers.   6
  The essential economic elements to this problem from drought are the potential 
yield loss from lack of rainfall and the costs of mitigation. Since the latter is a risk 
reduction response to the former then the insurable quantity is not necessarily yield per se, 
but the cost of irrigation. The yield loss component is economically significant only if 
irrigation is too costly or not available. To see how an indemnity structure works we can 
calculate the loss in profit from the following identity: 
(10) 
 =  Z  +  P ()  −  y
max () y ω () c ω
 
Equation (10) says that the indemnity is equal to the yield shortfall time price plus the cost 
of irrigation. If irrigation is not available then c(ω)=0 and the indemnity is given by the 
yield shortfall only. This is P(ymax – y(ω)) and this is similar to conventional crop 
insurance. If irrigation is available then irrigation may increase yields so that the term 
P(ymax – y(ω))→0, but in this case c(ω)>0 and this becomes the insurable event.  
  The notion of rainfall insurance is now clear. Since both y(ω) and c(ω) are 
functions of rainfall, and rainfall is a random variable, then yield and cost uncertainty can 
be established by defining the probability distribution functions for y and c.  Let g(ω) be 
the probability distribution function for rainfall, then the indemnity function for profits is 
calculated by taking the expected deviation from the maximum potential yield, or some 
other target, by defining the amount of rainfall that produces the maximum potential yield. 
In the current discussion this has been denoted by the variable ωgood . Hence the indemnity 
function is given by 
(11)






()  +  P ()  −  y
max () y ω () c ω () g ωω
 
Equation (11) is for the general case. When irrigation is not available then the 
insurance form is similar to conventional crop insurance (CI) by writing (11) as  
(12)   
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The final insurance product under consideration is irrigation insurance. Since ymax 
is an absorbing barrier for ω>ωgood then an irrigation strategy that provides irrigation in the 
amount of ωgood - ω will have y = ymax so that the first term in the general indemnity 
function (11) goes to zero leaving the irrigation cost recovery (ICR) indemnity function 
(13) 





() c ω () g ωω
. 
Notice that the irrigation cost recovery indemnity is simply the expected value of irrigation 
costs below the amount that produces the output ymax.  
Next, we consider possibilities for implementing a rainfall based insurance scheme. 
In all of the above equations the stochastic variable of interest is in fact rainfall. To 
estimate the above indemnity schedules, we require information that is not readily 
available for underwriting purposes. Furthermore, yields or revenues or irrigation costs are 
not readily observable without incurring substantial costs. In contrast, rainfall is readily 
observable since most jurisdictions record rainfall, at least at the county level. A rainfall 
based insurance policy can also be designed to mimic or approximate the indemnities for 
crop, revenue, or irrigation cost insurance by using the following rainfall indemnity 
schedule (RIS); 
(14) 






()  −  ω
good ω () g ωω
. 
In (14) the integral component gives the probability weighted expectation of rainfall below 
the good amount (e.g. millimeters of rain per month). The value of z represents the 
economic value of rainfall per millimeter or inch. In general, z in  equation (14)  can be   8
any value elected by the insurer but would normally be defined in the neighborhood of 










For example suppose that z=$1,000 and ωgood = 10 inches, then for every inch of rainfall 
below ωgood, the insured receives $1,000. If there is no rainfall then the insured would 
receive $10,000 (10 in x $1,000/in) to cover yield, revenue, or cost shortfalls, but if actual 
rainfall exceed ωgood then the indemnity is zero. By defining and empirically estimating 
C=c(ω), it is possible to map on this cost function the range of critical rainfall outcomes by 
defining the inverse function, ω =c
-1(C). From this relationship, an indemnity schedule and 
insurance premium can be developed. 
 
 3. Empirical Estimation  and Data Specification 
In this paper, a constant elasticity cost of irrigation function is assumed: 
(16)  
     CA
β ω =
 
where C represents the total variable cost of irrigation, A is an intercept multiplier, ω, is 
annual rainfall, and β is the cost elasticity of rainfall
1. The two coefficients of the model A 
and β are expected to be positive and negative, respectively. Using the above functional 
form, the marginal cost of rainfall is  given by  
(17)  
1  ()   c ' ()   cA






                                                           
1 It is important to note the simplifications made here. Our cost function is assumed only to be a function of rainfall, 
when other factors may well affect the cost of irrigation. Also, our use of annual rainfall is probably naïve. A more 
likely measure would be cumulative rainfall during the summer months, or as in Turvey (2001) specific periods 
throughout the growing season.   9
The necessary condition for rainfall insurance to be effective is that c’(ω) < 0 so that rain 
has an impact on the cost of irrigation. For the empirical estimation, the constant elasticity 
cost function is written equivalently as 
(18)   
ln ln ln CA β ω =+
 
Effectiveness can be measured by the cost elasticity of rainfall, β, which measures the 
percentage change in the cost of irrigation given a percentage change  in rainfall. 
  The primary data are cross-sectional data from the 1998 Farm and Ranch Irrigation 
Survey (FRIS), a survey of operators of irrigated farms (U.S Department of Commerce). 
This survey provides cross-sectional data on annual operating (maintenance and repairs, 
and energy) cost of irrigation. In contrast, Rainfall data are obtained from NOAA records 
and are merged with the FRIS data. Since cross sectional data of average farms in 48 U.S. 
states are used, unobserved heterogeneity among farms is accounted for in this study 
through the use of regional dummy variables in an OLS regression.
2 
Table 1 presents the sample data used in the analysis. Average farm costs for 
machinery and repairs, energy and irrigation are $3,037.69,  $6,157.75, and $9,195.44, 
respectively. The mean annual rainfall across all states is 39.17 inches. Table 2 shows the 
correlations between the variables. Of importance are correlations between rainfall and 
different categories of irrigation costs. These correlations are negative. They indicate that a 
decrease in  rainfall will most likely correspond with higher cost of irrigation.  
Since there are regional differences in terms of climate, the least-square dummy 
variable (LSDV) estimator is used to estimate the long-run cost function. It is expressed as: 
                                                           
2 Our use of cross-sectional, state-wide data is not the most desirable source of data. Our preferred approach would be 
to use consistent time-series for a county, state or region. However, such data are not readily  available. While our 
estimates are useful for illustrative purposes, readers should be cautious about using the estimates for real world 
applications.   10
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where Cf is the total variable farm cost of irrigation for the state farm average; αr is the 
regional-specific fixed-effect; Dr is the regional-effect dummy variable that takes the value 
1 for region r and zero otherwise.  Since the number of regions n is small, the estimation of 
equation (19) is achieved (using OLS) by suppressing the constant term and adding a 
dummy variable for each of the n regions, or equivalently, by keeping the constant term 
and adding n-1 dummies; ωf is the vector of observed rainfall; β is the unknown cost 
elasticity parameter; and εf is the error term which is independently and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) across average (state) farms and uncorrelated with the rainfall variable. 
The coefficient on rainfall, β, is expected to be negative.  The regional fixed-effects 
represented by different dummy variables associated with αr are expected to be positive or 
negative. Two versions  of the model were run. The first used total irrigation costs 
(maintenance and repairs), while the second used only the cost of energy. 
After estimating empirically equation (19), it is possible to map on the total or 
energy cost function the range of critical rainfall outcomes. Several strike levels of rainfall 
are calculated by inverting equation (19) and using the estimated parameters of the LSDV 
model and the mean values in Table 1. The purpose of the inversion is to provide some 
relationship between the rise in cost of irrigation and the rainfall deficit. To determine the 
critical rainfall values, energy and total costs of irrigation are held constant at their mean in 
the first case. The rainfall strike level is determined by ω
* = ω(C
 *, A, β).   outcomes The 
inverse function is defined as follows:   11
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In our example, we provide estimates for the state of New Jersey. Since the Mid Atlantic 
regional dummy variable was dropped, the estimates in Table 3 with all dummy 
coefficients set to zero gives an estimate for the Mid Atlantic region. Annual rainfall in 
New Jersey is 45.47 inches. Substituting 45.47  inches into the regressions resulted in an 
estimate of c(ω) of $1,045.32 for energy and $2,449.85 for total costs. By incrementing  
c(ω) from 0% to 25%, we use equation (20) to extract the appropriate rainfall strike level. 
Using the above computed range of critical rainfall outcomes, premiums are 













for an option-like insurance policy, and 
(24) 
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0  z  ( ) d( ) premium g
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for a lump sum payments. The difference between (23) and (24) is that the former, the 
indemnity increases with reduced rainfall, whereas in the latter a lump sum payment of z is 
*
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5. Empirical Results 
Table 3 presents the results of the LSDV regressions of the energy cost model and 
total irrigation. These cost models may be interpreted as long-run cost models of irrigation 
since we used cross-sectional data. The estimated parameters as well as associated standard 
errors are presented. Both models have low explanatory power but most of their 
coefficients are significant at  least at the 0.01 level of significance. The parameters of the 
cost elasticity of rainfall are negative, indicating that an increase in rainfall will decrease 
the cost of irrigation. Energy cost of irrigation is more sensitive to change in rainfall than 
the total cost of irrigation. This is due to its highly negative correlation (-0.453) with the 
rainfall variable.  
The estimated models were used to predict the energy and total costs of irrigation 
for New Jersey. Using equation (15) and the predicted costs, average total and average 
energy costs of irrigation were computed (2,449.85/45.47=$53.88) and 
(1,045.32/45.47=$22.99). These unit costs represent the economic values of rainfall per 
inch. 
  Tables 4 and 5 present the results of irrigation insurance calculations. Using time-
series data of New Jersey precipitation from 1949 to 2000,  the mean rainfall is about 
45.47 inches with a standard deviation of 6.6 inches, suggesting that drought is a relatively 
rare event in New Jersey.  Assuming a normal probability distribution function for rainfall, 
Monte Carlo simulations were used for insurance premium computation.  
Two types of rainfall insurance products are used for illustration in Tables 4 and 5:  
the put option and the lump sum option. Premiums  for the put option are generated using 
equation (23). For the lump sum option , the economic value of rainfall is assumed to be   13
constant at the level of $2,000 and $1,000 for total cost and energy cost of irrigation, 
respectively. As shown in both tables, premiums are positively associated with strike levels 
of rainfall. Table 4 shows the insurance costs when the insurance is tied to the energy costs 
of irrigation, while Table5 reports the results for total irrigation cost. To interpret these 
results consider the 10% increase row in Table 4. If an insured wants to protect or insure 
costs of about $1,149.85 then equation (20) the corresponding level of rainfall to insure is 
30.04 inches. Since, with a standard deviation in annual rainfall of only 6.6 inches per 
year, the cost of this insurance is low and only $0.53. For a lump sum payment of $1,000 if 
rainfall is below 30.04 inches, the insurance cost is $9.8. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
With a growing interest in weather-based insurance products, this paper has 
advanced the proposition that rainfall insurance can be used to insure against costly 
irrigation. A theoretical model was developed along the lines of tradeoff between the loss 
in revenues from unirrigated crops and the cost of irrigation to preserve yields in years or 
periods of drought. A simple cost function was estimated to illustrate the salient points of 
our proposition, and an example of costs of irrigation and insurance were calculated for 
New Jersey. Two types of insurance products were presented. The first has option like 
qualities wherein the payoff is linear with respect to rainfall increments below a strike (in 
inches). The second offered a lump sum payment if rainfall falls below the strike. Monte 
Carlo simulation was used (5000 iterations) and the results reported. 
  This paper is intended to be illustrative and did not examine the efficacy of 
irrigation insurance relative to other forms of insurance such as crop insurance. Such a   14
study should be undertaken. We also noted some deficiencies in the modeling approach we 
used. The use of cross sectional models using annual rainfalls is far less desirable. Then 
using time-series costs for a particular farm, region or state, with rainfall measured over 
specific time periods throughout the growing season. 
Nonetheless, this paper provides a reasonable starting point for examining how 
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Table 1: Statistics on Irrigation Costs and Rainfall (Cross sectional Data) 
 








Mean 3,037.69  6,157.75  9,195.44  39.17 
Standard Deviation   2,565.62  6615.00  8,828.89  14.09 
Minimum 270.00  134.02  439.64  13.45 
Maximum 12,742  32,190.02  44,932.02  63.38 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
 
  Machinery/Repair Cost   Energy Cost  Total Cost  Cumulative Rainfall 
Machinery/Repair Cost  1.000       
Energy Cost  0.813  1.000     
Total Cost  0.900  0.985  1.000   
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Table 3:  Estimated Regression Equations of Cost of Irrigation  
 
































F-Statistic 4.68 7.31 
RMSE 0.930  0.998 
R-Square 0.41  0.51   17
 
Table 4: Irrigation (Energy) Cost Recovery Indemnity for New Jersey 
 







Premium Lump  
Sum Energy ($) 
Mean 1,045.32  45.47  65.82  500 
5% Increase  1,097.58  36.78  7.24  94 
10% Increase  1,149.85  30.04         0.53  9.8 
15% Increase  1,202,12  24.76  0.03  0.8 
20% Increase  1,254.38  20.58  0  0 
25% Increase  1,306.65  17.23  0  0 
 
Table 5: Irrigation (Total) Cost Recovery Indemnity for New Jersey 





Premium Lump  
Sum Total ($) 
Mean 2,449.85  45.47  131.63  1,000 
5% Increase  2,572.34  31.24  1.81  31 
10% Increase  2,694.83  21.84         0  0.4 
15% Increase  2,817.33  15.52  0  0 
20% Increase  2,939.82  11.18  0  0 
25% Increase  3,062.31   8.17  0  0   18
 